Florida Law Review
Volume 10

Issue 2

Article 4

June 1957

Segregation in Interstate Transportation
Stephen C. McAliley

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Stephen C. McAliley, Segregation in Interstate Transportation, 10 Fla. L. Rev. 192 (1957).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol10/iss2/4

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Florida Law Review by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

McAliley: Segregation in Interstate Transportation

DATE DOWNLOADED: Thu Sep 8 16:12:32 2022
SOURCE: Content Downloaded from HeinOnline
Citations:
Bluebook 21st ed.
Stephen C. McAliley, Segregation in Interstate Transportation, 10 U. FLA. L. REV. 192
(1957).
ALWD 7th ed.
Stephen C. McAliley, Segregation in Interstate Transportation, 10 U. Fla. L. Rev. 192
(1957).
APA 7th ed.
McAliley, S. C. (1957). Segregation in interstate transportation. University of
Florida Law Review, 10(2), 192-208.
Chicago 17th ed.
Stephen C. McAliley, "Segregation in Interstate Transportation," University of
Florida Law Review 10, no. 2 (Summer 1957): 192-208
McGill Guide 9th ed.
Stephen C. McAliley, "Segregation in Interstate Transportation" (1957) 10:2 U Fla L
Rev 192.
AGLC 4th ed.
Stephen C. McAliley, 'Segregation in Interstate Transportation' (1957) 10(2)
University of Florida Law Review 192
MLA 9th ed.
McAliley, Stephen C. "Segregation in Interstate Transportation." University of
Florida Law Review, vol. 10, no. 2, Summer 1957, pp. 192-208. HeinOnline.
OSCOLA 4th ed.
Stephen C. McAliley, 'Segregation in Interstate Transportation' (1957) 10 U Fla L Rev
192
Provided by:
University of Florida / Lawton Chiles Legal Information Center
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance of HeinOnline's Terms and
Conditions of the license agreement available at
https://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope of your license, please use:
Copyright Information

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1957

1

Florida Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 2 [1957], Art. 4

NOTES
SEGREGATION IN INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION
Not since national prohibition has a social movement captured
the fancy of the American public in a manner comparable to the
current drive to abolish segregation of the races. The unique aspect
of this movement from the legal standpoint is that progress toward
the objective has been accomplished almost entirely by judicial
fiat. The litigation arising from segregation on common carriers
provides an excellent view of the panorama of legal manipulations
in effectuating integration of the races. The commerce clause, the
fifth and fourteenth amendments, and the Interstate Commerce Act
have all played their part as tools in abolishing segregation in interstate transportation.
The desire of the Southern people to have segregated facilities
in their public carriers was, of course, unaffected by whether the
particular carrier was in intrastate or interstate commerce; the distinction, however, between the two classifications becomes significant
from a legalistic point of view. There are two widely used techniques
for maintaining segregated passenger seating in transportation: state
statutes requiring that passengers be segregated while traveling
within the borders of the state and rules requiring segregated facilities promulgated by the carriers.
STATE STATUTES

The first important case involving state regulation of segregation on interstate carriers was Hall v. DeCuiri which involved a
Louisiana reconstruction law prohibiting carriers passing through
the state from segregating their passengers. The master of a river
boat, one Benson, refused to admit a Negro woman to a cabin reserved for whites. She successfully sued Benson for damages, basing
her action on the statute. The case was ultimately appealed to the
United States Supreme Court on the ground that the regulation encroached on the exclusive power of Congress to regulate interstate
commerce. The Court struck down the statute, declaring that "congressional inaction left Benson at liberty to adopt such reasonable
195 U.S. 485 (1878).

[1921
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rules and regulations for the disposition of passengers upon his boat,
while pursuing her voyage within Louisiana or without, as seemed
to him most for the interest of all concerned." 2 Mr. Justic Clifford,
concurring, added:3
"Substantial equality of right is the law of the State and of
the United States; but equality does not mean identity ....
Passengers are entitled to proper diet and lodging; but the
laws of the United States do not require the master of a
steamer to put persons in the same apartment who would be
repulsive or disagreeable to each other."
Whether a state statute that required, rather than prohibited,
segregation on interstate carriers would be invalid was not answered by Hall v. DeCuir; for sixty-eight years thereafter the question remained unsettled. The paucity of litigation on this issue during that period was probably the result of the practice adopted by
most state courts of construing state regulatory measures as applying
only to intrastate carriers.4 An unexpressed but undoubtedly important factor militating against an attempt by the state courts to
extend the operation of state segregation statutes into interstate
commerce was the prevalence of carrier regulations requiring passenger segregation.
In 1890 the United States Supreme Court, in Louisville, N.O.
& T. Ry. v. Mississippi,5 upheld a state statute requiring segregation
on intrastate carriers, but implied that had the statute applied to
interstate commerce it would have been invalid under the doctrine
of Hallv. DeCuir. Discussing Hall, the Court stated: 6
"So the decision was by its terms carefully limited to
those cases in which the law practically interfered with interstate commerce. Obviously whether interstate passengers of
one race should, in any portion of their journey, be compelled
.Id.

at 490.

Sld. at 503.
4

See, e.g., Ohio Valley Ry.'s Receiver v. Lander, 104 Ky. 431, 47 S.W. 344 (1898);
Louisiana, N.O. & T. Ry. v. State, 66 Miss. 662, 6 So. 203 (1889) (applied to all
intrastate passengers, even though traveling in interstate carriers); Southern Kansas
Ry. v. State, 44 Tex. Civ. App. 218, 99 S.W. 166 (1906).
r,133 U.S. 587 (1890).
Old. at 590.
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to share their cabin accomodations with passengers of another
race, was a question of interstate commerce, and to be determined by Congress alone."
Subsequent cases indicating that statutory segregation in intrastate commerce was constitutional also mentioned the fact that the
carrier was not involved in interstate commerce. 7 The Supreme
Court did, however, sustain a state segregation statute that was
applied to a carrier that was only "slightly" interstate.,
The first state courts to strike down statutory segregation on
interstate carriers relied primarily upon Hall v. DeCuir and the
dictum in Louisville, N.O. & T. Ry. v. Mississippi as prohibiting
state regulation of this aspect of interstate commerce.9 The Maryland Supreme Court struck down a segregation statute, partly as
a result of these Supreme Court decisions and partly because the
court considered the regulation to be an unreasonable burden on
interstate commerce. 10 In demonstrating the unreasonableness of
the regulation, the court used the later-to-become-familiar bugaboo
of a Negro routed out of his bed in the middle of the night and
forced to move to the colored car during the seven miles that
the train passed through a "segregation" state.
The proposition that a state has the power to require segregation on carriers within the state, even though they are involved
in interstate commerce, was first propounded by the Tennessee
Supreme Court." The court found Hall v. DeCuir distinguishable
and contended that, while a statute prohibiting segregation in interstate travel might well be an unreasonable interference with commerce between the states, the state's requirement of segregation on
interstate carriers was valid as a police regulation. The court made
a persuasive argument that the statute involved was a reasonable
regulation:12

"If it be true, as is sometimes said, that race prejudices exist
7See Chiles v. Chesapeake 9: 0. Ry., 218 U.S. 71, 75 (1910) (dictum); Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 548 (1896) (dictum).
8South Covington & C. St. Ry. v. Kentucky, 252 U.S. 399 (1920).
9
State ex rel. Abbot v. Hicks, 44 La. Ann. 770, 11 So. 74 (1892); Carrey v.
Spencer, 72 N.Y. St. 108, 36 N.Y. Supp. 886 (Sup. Ct. 1895).
'OHart v. State, 100 Md. 595, 60 At. 457 (1905).

"Smith v. State, 100 Tenn. 494, 46 S.W. 566 (1898), writ of error dismissed, 21

Sup. Ct. 917 (1900).
Id. at 510, 46 S.W. at 570.
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here that make it uncomfortable or unsafe or promotive of
disorder to mix the races in public conveyances, then both
safety and good order are promoted as well as comfort, in
their separation."
A Mississippi case involved a white woman who was mistakenly
forced to sleep in the Negro car.1 3 She sued the railway company
for damages. The defendant contended that the statute requiring
segregation did not apply to interstate commerce and that if it did
it was unconstitutional as an undue burden on such commerce.
The Mississippi Supreme Court held that the statute did apply to
trains moving in interstate commerce and that it constituted no
unreasonable burden. Replying to the charge that the statute was
4
discriminatory against Negroes, the court stated:'
"The statute was not enacted with any idea of discriminating against the members of either race; nor was it prompted
by prejudice or passion, but with the knowledge that the
enforced intermingling of the races would be distasteful to
both races, would inevitably result in discomfort to both, and
provoke and encourage conflicts endangering the peace and
quiet of the commonwealth."
In admitting that the question remained unsettled, the Mississippi court exhibited what today would be unusual deference to
the United States Supreme Court:' 3
"The ultimate settlement of the question rests with the
Supreme Court of the United States; and, until that great
court decides against the validity of the statute as construed
by us, we feel impelled to adhere to our belief that the law
is not only beyond criticism from a constitutional standpoint,
but is also a reasonable and wise exercise of the police power
of the state."
In 1946, sixty-eight years after Hall v. DeCuir, the validity of
a state statute that required segregation in interstate commerce
'3Alabama 8:V. Ry. v. Morris, 103 Miss. 511, 60 So. 11 (1912), writ of error dismissed, 234 U.S. 766 (1914).
24id. at 518, 60 So. at 13.
's5d. at 519, 60 So. at 14.
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was questioned before the United States Supreme Court in Morgan
v. Virginia.16 Morgan, a Negro, was charged with violating a Virginia statute which required that Negro passengers on carriers
passing through the state be segregated. The Court held the statute
invalid as applied to interstate commerce because it unduly burdened
commerce in a matter in which uniformity was necessary." The
burden apparently consisted of the possibility that Negroes would
be routed from their sleep in the middle of the night and be sent to
the back of the bus; no evidence that this actually happened is recited in the opinion. The opinion is even more vague as to the
reason for a requirement of national uniformity, stressing only
that various states have conflicting statutes regarding the segregation
or nonsegregation of interstate passengers.
Mr. Justice Burton dissented, finding no burden and no necessity
for national uniformity. He pointed out that "the undue burden
upon interstate commerce thus relied upon by the Court is not
complained of by the Federal Government, by any state, or by any
carrier.""' He thought that the existence of conflicting state statutes
indicated a need for local regulation rather than the necessity for
national uniformity: 19
"The fact, however, that 10 contiguous states in some degree
require, by state law, some racial separation of passengers
on motor carriers indicates a different appraisal by them of
the needs and conditions in those areas than in others. ...
This recital of existing legislative diversity is evidence against
the validity of the assumption by this Court that there
exists today a requirement of a single uniform national rule
on the subject."
Perhaps the most reasonable position was that taken by concurring Justice Frankfurter, who considered that the Court was
bound to invalidate this statute on the authority of Hall v. DeCuir,
regardless of whether the statute prohibited or required segregation.
Morgan v. Virginia has the distinction of being the first case
16328 U.S. 373 (1946).
17This holding was followed in Charles v. Norfolk Ry., 188 F.2d 691 (7th Cir.
1951), and Lee v. Commonwealth, 189 Va. 890, 54 S.E.2d 888 (1949).
18328 U.S. at 389.
'91d. at 394.
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to crack the barrier of segregation in interstate transportation; it
is also the only one of the recent desegregation decisions that has
some foundation in judicial precedent.
The Morgan case did not, in any sense, abolish segregation in
interstate commerce but, as indicated in Pridgen v. Carolina Coach
Co.,20 simply denied the right of a state to require segregation. The
carrier, theoretically, remained free to segregate its passengers if it
so wished - in the absence of congressional regulation to the contrary. 21
CARRIER REGULATIONS
One of the more difficult problems confronting the opponents
of segregation in interstate transportation is the segregation of passengers required by the carriers themselves. Here the twin daggers
of due process and equal protection of the laws have no target
because no state or federal action is involved. The right of the
carrier to seat its passengers as it wishes, as long as no inequality
appears, is so generally recognized that the United States Supreme
Court has yet to invalidate this practice.
Rights of a Common CarrierUnder the Commerce Clause
It was early established that in the absence of federal legislation
carriers involved in interstate commerce had the right to make
reasonable rules and regulations, including the segregation of passengers. 22 In Logwood v. Memphis & C.R.R.,23 decided in 1885,
Judge Hammond, unenlightened by Swedish sociologists, set forth
the law:
"Common carriers are required by law not to make any unjust discrimination, and must treat all passengers paying
the same price alike. Equal accomodations do not mean
identical accomodations. Races and nationalities, under some
20229 N.C. 46, 47 S.E.2d 609 (1948).
2
1See Day v. Atlantic Greyhound Co., 171 F.2d 59 (4th Cir. 1948).
22See Hall v. DeCuir, 95 US. 485 (1878); McGuinn v. Forbes, 37 Fed. 639 (D.
Md. 1889); Houck v. Southern Pac. Ry., 38 Fed. 226 (W.D. Tex. 1888).
2323 Fed. 318, 319 (W.D. Tenn. 1885). Note the nefarious assumption that pas-

sengers can be segregated and still have equal facilities-an idea frequently attributed to Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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circumstances, to be determined on the facts of each case, may
be reasonably separated; but in all cases the carrier must furnish substantially the same accomodations to all, by providing
equal comforts, privileges, and pleasures to every class. Colored people and white people may be so separated, if carriers proceed according to this rule."
During the same year a federal district court, in The Sue'24 held
that segregation regulations of an interstate carrier were not unconstitutional if predicated on a reasonable basis and not discriminatory. As to the reasonableness of the regulation the court said:2 5
"It must be admitted that a regulation, which a carrier may
lawfully make, if reasonable, has strong argument in favor
of its reasonableness if it is demanded by a great majority of
the traveling public who use his conveyance."
McGuinn v. Forbes26 involved a Negro clergyman who, during his
passage on a steamboat, seated himself at a dinner table already
occupied by three white passengers. The white passengers complained, and the captain asked the clergyman to move to another
table. Upon his refusal the captain and the white passengers removed themselves to another table, leaving the clergyman alone in
his Pyrrhic victory. The clergyman sought surcease from his humiliation in an action for damages against the shipowners. The
court, citing The Sue, held that the captain's action was constitutional and not unreasonable in view of the attitude of the other
27
passengers. Said the court:
"When public sentiment demands a separation of the passengers, it must be gratified to some extent. While this sentiment prevails among the traveling public, although unreasonable and foolish, it cannot be said that the carrier must
be compelled to sacrifice his business in order to combat it."
The question of the validity of segregation regulations pro2422 Fed. 843 (D. Md. 1885).
251d. at 845.
2637 Fed. 639 (D. Md. 1889).
271d. at 641.
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mulgated by carriers involved in interstate commerce eventually
reached the United States Supreme Court in Chiles v. Chesapeake
& Ohio Ry. 281 The plaintiff "'was an interstate passenger who knew
his rights'" and refused to sit in the section reserved for Negroes.
With the assistance of an officer of the law the plaintiff was seated
in the colored section. When sued for damages, the railroad contended that its own rules and regulations providing for segregated
seating facilities were not prohibited by any constitutional provision. The Court held, citing Hall v. DeCuir,29 that the regulation
was not unconstitutional. Replying to the contention that the regu30
lation violated the commerce clause the Court said:
"[Wie must keep in mind that we are not dealing with the
law of a State attempting a regulation of interstate commerce beyond its power to make. We are dealing with the
act of a private person, to wit, the railroad company, and the
distinction between state and interstate commerce we think
is unimportant."
The Court reiterated the statement in Hall v. DeCuir that
inaction by Congress was "equivalent to a declaration that interstate commerce shall remain free and untrammeled," and stated: 3'
"[T]he interstate commerce clause does not constrain the
action of carriers, but on the contrary leaves them to adopt
rules and regulations for the government of their business,
free from any interference except by Congress."
In speaking of the reasonableness of the regulation, the Court concluded that "regulations which are induced by the general sentiment of the community upon whom they operate, cannot be said
'32
to be unreasonable.
The decision of the Supreme Court in the Chiles case apparently
settled the issue; and, with one exception, 33 no litigation involving
28218 U.S. 71 (1910).
2995 U.S. 485 (1878).
30218 U.S. at 75.

311d. at 76.

321d. at 77.
331Vashington, B. & A. Elec. R.R. v. Waller, 289 Fed. 598 (D.C. Cir. 1923). The
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segregation regulations appeared in the federal courts for nearly
thirty years.
Section 3(1) of the Interstate Commerce Act
In 1941 the United States Supreme Court struck down a carrier
regulation in Mitchell v. United States.34 The railroad provided
no Negro Pullman car but did provide drawing room space for
Negroes at the lower Pullman rate - when available. A Negro
could assure himself of accommodations by advance reservation. If,
however, he sought a Pullman on the day of travel, he would get
the substitute drawing room only if it were available. The Court held
that this regulation denied Negroes equal treatment and was therefore void. If Negroes were unequally treated by the regulation, it
would follow that the railroad violated the common law rule that
a common carrier must provide equal facilities for passengers paying
the same fare. 35 The Court, however, found the requirement of
equality not in the common law but in section 3 (1) of the Interstate Commerce Act, enacted in 1887.36 The initial objective of
this section was the stamping out of the then frequent practice of
37
giving rebates and special rates to certain customers of the railroad.
The Mitchell case did not, of course, pretend to prohibit the carrier
from segregating its passengers; the importance of the case lies in
its emphasis on equal treatment and its use of section 3 (1), rather
than the common law, as the source of the equality requirement.
New litigation was soon begun under the figurehead of one
Henderson, who complained of segregation in dining cars. The
court acknowledged the right of the carrier to segregate its passengers by regulation
but held that the carrier had not in fact made such a regulation.
34313 U.S. 80 (1941).

35See Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1878); McGuinn v. Forbes, 37 Fed. 639 (D.
Md. 1889); Houck v. Southern Pac. Ry., 38 Fed. 226 (W.D. Tex. 1888).
3624 STAT. 380 (1887), 49 U.S.C. §3 (1) (1952).
37See ICC v. Chicago, G.W. Ry., 141 Fed. 1003 (N.D. Ill. 1905), afl'd, 209 U.S.
108 (1908); United States ex rel. Morris v. Delaware, L. & W.R.R., 40 Fed. 101
(N.D.N.Y. 1889). At the time of the Mitchell case §3(1) read: "[I]t shall be unlawful for any common carrier subject to the provisions of this chapter to make
or give any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person, company, firm, corporation, or locality, or any particular description of traffic,
in any respect whatsoever, or to subject any particular person, company, firm,
corporation, or locality, or any particular description of traffic, to any undue or
unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever."
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Southern Railway set aside six seats in each dining car for Negroes.
Henderson was refused service in the dining car because the steward,
confronted with an overcrowded train, permitted white passengers
to occupy all of the dining car seats and served Negroes in their
coach or Pullman accomodations at no extra cost. Henderson filed
a complaint before the Interstate Commerce Commission challenging the regulation and its execution by the steward.3 k The Commission held that the regulation provided substantially equal
treatment for equal fares but that the steward was wrong in deviating from the regulation; however, no damages were awarded. Henderson then brought an action in a federal district court.39 In addition to complaining of unequal treatment, he contended that
segregation, as such, violated the Interstate Commerce Act. The court
summarily dismissed this contention, holding that racial segregation of interstate passengers was not "per se forbidden by the Constitution, the Interstate Commerce Act, or any other Act of Congress." 40 The court, however, found that there was substantial inequality in the treatment of Negroes under the regulation and remanded the case to the Commission.
After the Commission again decided in favor of the carrier the
case reached the United States Supreme Court. In Henderson v.
United States42 the Supreme Court ignored Henderson's contention
that segregation per se violated the Interstate Commerce Act, but
held the regulation to be an "unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage" within the meaning of section 3 (1) of the Interstate Commerce Act. This result was reached on the amazing theory that both
races were simultaneously discriminated against by the regulation.
The Court did not define its use of the word "discriminate," nor
did it discuss the unreasonableness of the regulation. The Court
apparently held that, even though a segregation regulation met the
long-established requirement of equal treatment, it might nevertheless violate section 3(1) by discriminating against both races.
3sHenderson v. Southern Ry., 258 I.C.C. 413 (1944).
39Henderson v. United States, 63 F. Supp. 906 (D. Md. 1945).
401d. at 914.
41
0n further

hearing, Henderson v. Southern Ry., 269 I.C.C. 73 (1947), the
Commission found that recent changes in the regulation by the carrier, though
preserving the segregated dining of interstate passengers, complied witli *the

substantial equality requirement of §3 (1) under the distridt couirt's interpretation
thereof.
42339 U.S. 816 (1949).
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Fortunately, this semantic somersault was not repeated in later cases.
The Effect of Morgan v. Virginia
The 1946 decision of Morgan v. Virginia,43 holding a state statute
requiring segregation in interstate commerce to be an unconstitutional regulation of commerce, produced a new flood of litigation
directed against carrier regulations. Not only did Negro plaintiffs
cite Morgan as controlling but frequently contended that carrier
regulations imposing racial segregation on its passengers violated
the fourteenth amendment! These assertions met with little success.
Simmons v. Atlantic Greyhound Co. 44 involved a Negro passenger

who was required to seat himself in the rear of the bus, despite his
contention to the driver that he was an interstate passenger and
that this action was contrary to "the Supreme Court law" - apparently referring to Morgan v. Virginia. The bus company had filed
tariffs with the Interstate Commerce Commission that reserved the
right to control the seating of passengers. The district court disposed of Morgan v. Virginia as inapplicable to a carrier regulation,
and held that the regulation met the reasonableness test - conformance to "the established usages, customs and traditions of the
people." 45 In concluding, the court emphasized that the power to
46
regulate commerce lay in Congress, not in the federal courts:
"It must be repeated and steadily borne in mind that the
power to regulate interstate commerce is vested in Congress.
This power Congress has, within certain limits, delegated
to the Interstate Commerce Commission. To what limits the
powers of this latter body extend need not be inquired into.
The fact remains that neither Congress nor any agency created
by it has sought to impose any regulation dealing with the
separation of passengers in interstate commerce. In fact, although efforts have been made over some years to induce
Congress to enact legislation on this subject, it has consistently refused to attempt such regulation. This is a field
of Congressional duty and responsibility. This court can43328 U.S. 373 (1946).
4475 F. Supp. 166 (W.D. Va. 1947).

45d. at 174.
461d. at 176.
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not invade it and, by usurping the power of Congress, lay
down rules by which this defendant must guide the operation of its business-rules which Congress, in the exercise
of power specifically and solely entrusted to it, has refused
to lay down."
In Day v. Atlantic Greyhound Co.47 the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals held that the question of an interstate motor carrier's
rights to segregate its passengers was "not open to debate in this
court," and continued: 48
"It is foreclosed by binding decisions of the Supreme Court
which hold that an interstate carrier has a right to establish
rules and regulations which require white and colored passengers to occupy separate accomodations provided there is
no discrimination in the arrangement."
The Burden Theory
Less than a year after the Day case the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals, in Whiteside v. Southern Bus Lines, Inc.,49 held the regulations of an interstate motor carrier invalid as a burden on interstate commerce. This understandably short opinion, which provoked a flurry of amazed criticism in legal periodicals,50 may bear
some analysis.
The opinion cited no authority for the proposition that a regulation of a carrier can be invalid as repugnant to the commerce clause.
Clause 3, section 8, of article 1 of the Constitution of the United
States empowers Congress to regulate commerce among the several
states. The regulation in question was not held invalid under the
congressional legislation applicable to the respondent, the Motor
Carriers Act. 51 Yet it violated the clause in the Constitution that
gave Congress the power to regulate commerce. The Supreme
Court had previously stated that the commerce clause did not
restrain the action of carriers but left them free to adopt their own
47171

F.2d 59 (4th Cir. 1948).

4s1d. at 60.

40177 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1949).
50E.g., 2 BAYLOR L. R1Ev. 369 (1950); 45 ILL. L. REv. 671 (1950); 4
REv. 719 (1950).
5149 STAT. 54a (1935), 49 U.S.C. §§301-27 (1952).
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rules and regulations.5 2 It would seem that the only way a carrier
could violate the commerce clause would be by a refusal to obey
applicable congressional legislation.
The court spoke of the segregation regulation as being a "burden on commerce." Assuming that there was a burden on commerce, what rule of law prohibited its imposition? A state was not
allowed to burden commerce because it would encroach upon the
exclusive power of Congress to regulate commerce; the courts presumed that inaction by Congress was equivalent to a declaration
that commerce should remain free from state regulation. 5, No such
reasoning is applicable to the regulations of the carrier itself.
The court, in effect, denied Congress the exclusive power to
regulate commerce by creating an identical power in itself. As one
54
writer has indicated:
"[hf the rule promulgated in the instant case had been the
law there would have been no need for federal anti-trust
legislation inasmuch as the federal courts would have had
the authority and duty to nullify any contract, policy, or
regulation which tended to restrict interstate commerce."
In fact, much of the federal prohibitory legislation based on the
commerce clause would have been unnecessary.
The court suggested as an alternative that the regulation might
be invalid as a violation of the fourteenth amendment; the requisite state action was found in the action of the police officer in
ejecting the plaintiff from the bus. There is some indication that
the intent of the framers of the Constitution and its amendments
may not have been the sole factor that led the court to reach its
decision:- 5
"It may be that in a period when the democratic way of life
is challenged by another political and economic faith, the
times invite a reappraisal of the scope of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the end that in our effort to contain ideo52See Chiles v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 218 U.S. 71 (1910); Hall v. DeCuir, 95
U.S. 485 (1878).
53Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1878).
542 BAYLOR L. REV. 369, 371 (1950).
55177 F.2d 949, 951 (6th Cir. 1949).
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logical concepts of government conflicting with our own ....
local practices may more nearly conform to our democratic
professions."
Let us hope that better weapons with which to fight communism
may be found than the decision in Whiteside v. Southern Bus Lines.
It may be, however, that the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals will
succeed where the State Department has failed.
One writer in referring to the Whiteside case stated that "a contrary result was reached by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Day v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp."56 He spoke too soon. The
Fourth Circuit, three years after Day, in Chance v. Lambeth57 held
a segregation regulation of a railway invalid as a burden upon'
interstate commerce. The court relied largely on Whiteside and
distinguished,58 as well as it could, its earlier holding in Day but
outdistanced itself by also using Hall v. DeCuir as authority. Hall v.
DeCuir held that a state could not prohibit segregation in interstate commerce, because the carrier had a common law right, untouched by Congress, to seat passengers on any basis that was most
beneficial to all concerned. The court used Hall v. DeCuir to deny the
carrier that very right.
Subsequently a case was brought in a district court in the Fourth
Circuit involving a bus company's segregation regulation. The court,
invalidating the regulation, considered itself bound by the decision in Chance v. Lambeth. The opinion in this case, Williams v.
CarolinaCoach Co., stated: 59
"No useful purpose could be served by prolonging this
discussion of either the principles involved or the law applicable. In the present state of the law the Courts whose decisions are binding upon this Court have spoken. The pronouncement of those Courts are clear. The regulation in
question, they hold, imposes an undue burden upon interstate commerce. When undue burden upon interstate commerce is caused by a regulation and Congress has not exer5Hyman, Segregation and the Fourteenth Amendment, 4 VAND. L. Rav. 555,

565, n.53 (1951).
57186 F.2d 879 (4th Cir. 1951).
5sd.at 883.

59111 F. Supp. 329, 338 '(E.D. Va. 1952).
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cised the power conferred upon it by the Constitution, such
regulation must be declared invalid by the Courts. Chance
v. Lambeth, supra."

On appeal the award of damages was affirmed by the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals in a per curiam opinion, but not on the
ground that the regulation was an unlawful burden on commerce: 0
"We think that the judgment appealed
affirmed because the regulations relied on
the bus driver in an unreasonable manner
passenger to change his seat in an interstate
had been properly seated in accordance with

from should be
were applied by
in requiring the
journey after he
the regulations."

Thus the court impliedly approved the regulation, objecting only
to its application in an unreasonable manner, and apparently re61
treated from its position in Chance v. Lambeth.
The assertion that a private act can be declared invalid by a
court as an unconstitutional burden on commerce has not reappeared in an opinion since the 1953 decision in Williams v. Carolina
Coach Co., and the Supreme Court has not reviewed the cases so
holding. Rightly or wrongly, the decisions following the burden
theory probably accomplished the desired objective of causing most
carriers in interstate commerce to abolish their segregation regu6
lations. 2
The latest theory used for invalidating segregation regulations of
carriers appears in two decisions rendered by the Interstate Commerce Commission. The principal decision is entitled National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. St. LouisSan Francisco Ry. 6 3 The complaint was filed by the N.A.A.C.P.
against the fourteen railroads in interstate commerce that required
segregation of their passengers. A brief was filed on behalf of the
6oCarolina Coach Co. v. Williams, 207 F.2d 408, 409 (4th Cir. 1953) (emphasis
added).

6IThe Fourth Circuit has never stated that a segregation regulation per se is
invalid as a burden on commerce, but the differences between the regulations involved in the three cases were very slight.
62By Nov. 1955 apparently only 14 railroads segregated their passengers. NAACP
v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 11 Fed. Carr. Cas. [33,403, 1 RAcE REL. L. REP. 263
(1955).
6311 Fed. Carr. Cas.

33,403, 1 RACE REL. L. REP. 263 (1955).
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United States as amicus curiae in support of the complaint. As a
result of stipulations of fact agreed upon prior to the hearing, the
sole issue presented to the Commission was the lawfulness of racial
segregation per se; no issue of equal treatment was raised. The
Commission held that racial segregation, in itself, violated section
3 (1) of the Interstate Commerce Act. 64 The crux of the Com65
mission's opinion is in the following statement:
"The complainants invoke our authority to prevent violations of section 3 (1), which makes it unlawful for a railcarrier 'to subject any particular person ... to any undue or
unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever.' The disadvantages to a traveler who is assigned solely
because of his race must be regarded under present conditions as unreasonable."66
Let us analyze this reasoning. Does prohibiting the Negro from
occupying those portions of the car reserved for the other race
operate to his disadvantage? No, it wouldn't seem so. You have to
sit somewhere. You can only sit in one seat. Your- relative position
in the train wouldn't seem to matter as much as whether you were
seated by the window. It was admitted in the principal case that
there was no physical disadvantage effected by the separation. In
wandering off into what is necessarily a rather metaphysical field
and deciding the case on the basis of "unwarranted feelings of inferiority" the Interstate Commerce Commission seems to have
bitten off more than statutory prohibitions usually embrace. Note
that in Brown v. Board of Education6 7 the Supreme Court tied the
psychological disadvantage to a tangible disadvantage. The Negro
is in a separate school. He feels inferior. Therefore, he doesn't have
equal protection of the laws because he cannot get as good an edu18In the companion case, Keys v. Carolina Coach Co., 11 Fed. Carr. Cas.
P3,403, 1 RAcE RELr L. REP. 272 (1955), the Commission held that segregation
was also contrary to §316(d) of the Motor Carriers Act, 49 STAT. 543, 558 (1935),
49 U.S.C. §316(d) (1952), which contains language similar to §3 (l).
651 RAcE Rar. L. REP. 263, 270 (1955) (emphasis added).
6eCommissioner Johnson dissented, stating: "It is my opinion that the Commission should not undertake to anticipate the Court and itself become a pioneer
in the sociological field." Id. at 271.
67347 U.S. 483 (1954). The Brown case held that segregation in public schools
was unconstitutional.
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cation while he is feeling inferior. This reasoning cannot apply to
train travel. The Negro is not only getting an equal ride, he is
getting an identical ride.
Turn the coin over. Is it not equally disadvantageous to a white
person who objects to any association with Negroes for a carrier
to permit Negroes to sit next to him? The Negro wants to sit with
the whites; the white doesn't want to sit with Negroes. Who prevails? The Chiles case and Hall v. DeCuir say that this is up to the
individual carrier. If the Commission says that the Negro can't be
segregated, isn't it saying: "White passengers, you shouldn't feel the
way that you do; the Negro should feel the way that he does, thus
the separation is an unreasonable disadvantage to the Negro because we, the Commission, agree with the feelings of the Negro"?
Then a Commission that didn't like to ride next to Negroes would
not think that there was any unreasonable disadvantage.
Even more difficult to accept is the assumption that section 3 (1)
of the Interstate Commerce Act, passed with the initial objective
of combating rate discriminations of railroads, abolished segregation in common carriers. Evidently the many congressmen who in
recent years introduced bills designed to abolish segregation in interstate commerce 68 were blissfully unaware that applicable legislation had already been enacted in the nineteenth century. The Chiles
case, decided in 1911, speaks of the "absence of Congressional legislation" concerning segregation in interstate transportation that left
the carriers "free to adopt their own reasonable rules and regulations." Section 3 (1) was not applied to questions of passenger
segregation until 1940. Even then the Supreme Court recognized
only that substantial equality of treatment was required by the
statute.6 9
No additional action concerning the Commission's decision in
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v.
St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. has been reported. If the decision is
appealed, it is doubtful whether the present United States Supreme
Court will rule upon the question as long as the circuit courts
of appeal uphold the Commission's ruling. If the conclusion that
an interstate carrier cannot segregate its passengers must be reached,
6SSee Morgan v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 24, 34 S.E.2d 491 (1945), for a recitation of those attempts.
69Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80 (1941).
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